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THE MEXICAN SITUAT!ON FROM A MEXICAN 
POINT OF VIEW 
By Lic. Luis Cabrera, recently Speaker oj the House oj Rep-
resentati'i!es in the M exican C ongress 
Much has been said in the United States about the Mexi-
can situation, but actual conditions in Mexico have never 
bcen fully undcrstood, because they have always been 
studied from an American point of view. 
The sources from which Americans draw their information 
about Mexico are chiefly foreign residents and investors, 
who are very apt to consider the Mexican situation only 
from the standpoint of their own interests. All that for-
eigners seek in Mexico is the reestablishment of a state of 
things favoring the continuation and promotion of business. 
They generally believe that the conditions of Mcxicans 
themselves, and of those issues which are of a purely na-
tional character, do not concern them, and consequently 
they do not regard them as necessary factors in the problem, 
such as they understand it. Hence, the proposing of solu-
tions which, although beneficia! perhaps to foreign interests, 
do not tend to solve the Mexican problem itself. 
To fully understand the Mexican situation and to find 
satisfactory solutions both to Mexican and foreign interests, 
it is necessary to study the question from a Mexican point 
of view. 
Such is the purpose of this paper. 
Foreigners in Mexico believe that the only political prob-
lem which interests thcm is peacc. But misled by 
superficial judgment or pushed by impatience, thcy have 
believed that the establishment of peace in Mexico depends 
only on thc energy with which the country is govcrned. 
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All foreigners in Mexico look for a strong government, an 
iron hand or iron fist, and the only thing they discuss is 
whether a certain roan is sufliciently strong or energetic 
to govern the country. And when they find a man with 
such qualities, foreigners always have believed that it was 
their duty to help that man to come into power and to sup-
port him. 
These were the reasons for the foreign sympathy in favor 
of General Reyes first, General Félix Diaz afterwards, and 
General Huerta, and these are the reasons why President 
Madero did not get the full support of foreigners. He was 
considered a weak man, and consequently unable to establish 
peace. 
It is necessary to rectify foreign opinion about strong 
governments in Mexieo. 
A strong government is not the one able to maintain peace 
by the mere force of arms, but the one which can obtain the 
support of the majority of the country. Any peace obtained 
by the system of the iron fist is only a tcmporary peace. 
Permanent peace in Mexieo must be based on certain eco-
nomic, political and social conditions which would produce 
a stable equilibrium between the higher and the lower 
classes of the nation. 
Foreigncrs ought to be persuaded that to have real 
guarantees for their interests it is necessary that such in-
terests be based on the welfare of the people of Mexico. 
It is then to the interest of foreign capitalists to help 
Mexicans to obtain such conditions as will produce perma-
nent peace in Mexico. 
The troubles in Mexico during the last three years are 
attributable to mal-administration covering a period of 
thirty years. The interna! upheaval in Mexico could not 
have grown to the importance that it has reached, had 
it only had the object of satisfying personal ambitions. 
The revolution in Mexico could not be so strong as it is, 
were robbery the only purpose of the soldiers or was personal 
ambition the only motive of the leaders. 
The truth is that the Mexican disturbances are a real 
revolution of apparently political aspect, but at the very 
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bottom of economic and social tendencies. The present 
revolution in Mexico is only the continuation of a revolution 
begun in 1910. 
The present revolution's main purposes are to free the 
lower classes from the condition of slavery in which they 
have been for a long time and to seek for an improvement 
in their economic and social conditions. 
In Mexico there is no real middle class. The purpo~e 
of the present revolution is the creation of such a class which 
may help the country to have a social equilibrium. There 
is no real social equilibrium and there is no peace, and there 
is no democratic forro of government without a middle 
class. 
The causes of the Mexican revolution and its aims, are 
of a social, economic and political character. Consequently 
the Mexican question presenta three different aspects, inti-
mately related to each other, that can be called the social, 
economic and política! aspects of the Mexican question. 
SOCIAL AsPECT 
Mexico has a population oí about 15,000,000 inhabitants, 
15 per cent of which are Indians, 75 per cent mixed or "mes-
tizos" and 10 per cent of European descent. Each one of 
these groups presents different characteristics and even the 
"mestizos" cannot be said to be homogeneous, since there 
are various racial types among them. 
Mexico, however, has no real race problem. Properly 
speaking, there are no insoluble conflicts between the vari-
ous elements of the nation, because the Indians are easily 
assimilated by the "mestizos," and as a matter of fact, 
when the Indians receive education or mix with the "mes-
tizos," they immediately become identified with them. 
A full blooded Indian who has received a certain amount 
of education, is always sure to keep it, and he never shows 
any retrogressive tendencies, so that we can say that the 
effects of education upon the native Indians of Mexico are of 
a permanent character. 
On the other hand, the mestizo element of the population 
of Mexico intermarry, verv"_easily_ .with the Europeans, 
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particularly with the Spaniards and French, and as soon 
as they have received a proper education or have acquired 
sorne economic welfare, they can be considered on prac-
tically the same leve! as any of the European residents. 
But true as it is that this variety of races cannot be re-
garded as a social problem for Mexico, the large div.ersity 
of types of civilization found among those races, on the 
other hand, do give rise to grave difficulties, from the point 
of view of the government of the country. 
The problem that every administration has to face in 
Mexico, that is to say, the social problem in its broadest 
sense, is to find a rule or a formula of government which 
shall be suitable to al! the dissimilar elements of the 
population, orto find the various co-existing formulre of gov-
ernment suitable to each one of the various groups of popula-
tion. It is very difficult indeed to find a formula of govcrn-
mcnt suitable at the same time to a fiftcenth century type 
of civilization (Indians); to an eighteenth century type 
(largest part of the mixed races); to a nineteenth century 
type of civilization (educated mestizos) and to a twentieth 
century type (foreigners and Mcxicans of high culture). 
The systems uscd up to the present to govern these dis-
similar groups havo failed, that of General Diaz pretending 
to rule the country with sixteenth century proceedings, as 
well as that of Madero pretending to rule on a nineteenth 
century system. This social problem is intimately related 
to the política! problem of the unfitness of the laws of Mexico. 
The política! problem of ruling over the different races 
in Mexico could have more or less adequate solutions, but 
the social problem has but one solution, namely: education. 
Fortunately, the characteristics of the Indian and mixed 
races, and their facility to assimilate into the white race, 
give sufficient grounds to believe that the problem can easily 
be solved simply by means of an educational policy wisely 
matured and persistently applied. 
It can be safely said that in fifty years from now, if the 
education of the Indians is kept up, alllocal dialects will die 
away and the whole Indian population will be assimilated 
by the mixed raee. 
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EcoNoMIC AsPECT 
The principal causes of the revolution in Mexico are 
undoubtedly of an economic, and chiefly of an agracian 
character. 
The colonial policies followed by Spaniards, when they 
conquered Mexico, consisted in taking possession of the 
greatest part of the lands of N ew Spain to grant them to 
the Spanish conquerors. Extensive land concessions were 
granted now in favor of the church, nowin favor of the Span-
ish soldiers, leaders, chieftains, or mere settlers. 
Together with each one of those large concessions granted 
in favor of Spaniards, a large number of Indians were al~o 
assigned to them with the apparent object of educating 
and Christianizing them, but with the real purpose of ob-
taining slaves, or Iand serfs, to cultivate and develop the 
lands granted. 
With regard to the Indian towns already existing at the 
time of the conquest, they were theoretically respected 
together with their lands. N ew towns were also laid out 
as Indian reservations, providing them with sufficient lands 
which were ca\led "egidos" and "propios," for the common 
use of al! the inhabitants. 
The colonial policies of Spain resulted therefore in the 
formation of a wealthy class of landholders as against the 
Indian population, which found itself either assigned to 
the estates as land serfs or concentrated in Indian towns. 
In 1810 the freedom of slaves and Indians was officially 
decreed by Hidalgo, but the independence of Mexico hav-
ing been accomplished by the wealthy landholders, the 
situation of the Indians was not materially changed, and 
the lower classes still remained in a state of actual serv-
itude, although, theoretically, slavery had been already 
abolished. , 
We can safely say that up to 1856 the only real-estate 
property of any importance, which was not in the hands of 
the Spanish great landholders, was the property of the church 
and the "commons" of the Indian towns. 
The church had been acquiring .large territorial property 
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obtained either by direct concessions from the Govern-
ment or by donations and foundations from prívate sources. 
The towns still were awning their communal lands 
granted to them, as stated above, for the purpose of graz-
ing, timbering, farming and watering, and which were called 
"egidos." The characteristic aspcct of the agrarian ques-
tions in Mexico was for nearly two centuries, the obstínate 
defense made by the towns against the great landholders 
who always tried to invade the communal lan~s. 
From 1856 to 1859 certain laws were enacted in arder to 
do away with the mainmort. About the middle of 1859, 
the liberal administration of Juarez, for political reasons, 
was compelled to deprive the church of its properties and 
to begin to approprbte them to prívate individuals, who 
wished to acquire them at low prices. 
Towards 1859 also, and as a consequence of the laws 
enacted to do away with thc mainmort, the "egidas" of 
the towns began to be divided up and apportioned in sma!Í 
parcels among the inhabitants, for the purpose of creating 
small agricultura! properties, but through ignorance and 
Jack of means, those lands were almost immediately resold 
to the great landholders whose propertics were adjacent 
to the "egidos." 
- About 1876, at the beginning of the "porfirista" regime, 
(the administration of General Porfirio Diaz) the real prop-
erty of the church had already passed into the hands of 
prívate individuals, and the communal property of the 
towns was beginning to be divided among the masses. 
There still remain, however, large estates owned by old 
wealthy families of Spanish origin, which could be considerad 
as real mainmort, and which are now responsible íor the pres-
ent agrarian conflict. 
The "porfirista" regime can be defined by saying that it 
consisted in putting the power in the hands of the large land-
holders, thus creating a feudal system. 
The local governments of the different states in Mexico 
and nearly all the important public offices, were almost 
always in the hands of, or controlled by, wealthy families 
owning large tracts of land, which of course were inclined to 
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extend protection to all properties such as theirs. Torres 
and Izábal in Sonora, Terrazas in Chihuahua, Garza Galán 
in Coahuila, Redo in Sinaloa, Obregons in Guanajuato, the 
Escandons in Morelos, etc., are instances of great landhold-
ers who always had an absolute control over the government 
of their respective states. 
The política!, social and economic ·influence exerted by 
landholders during General Diaz's administration, was so 
considerable and so advantageous to them, that it hampered 
the dcvelopment of the small agricultura! property, which 
could have otherwise beeh formed from the division of 
ecclesiastical and communallands. 
The large estates called haciendas, pay only about 10 
per cent of the taxes levied by law as result of misrepre-
senting the value of the property, while the small landholder 
is obliged to pay the whole tax imposed as he is unable to 
successfully misrepresent the value of his small holdings 
and as he lacks the political influence to obtain reductions. 
The result of this system of inequitable taxation has been 
the gradual disappearance of small holdings which were 
absorbed by the large estates. This system was continued 
all through General Diaz's administration, thus increasing 
the power of the great landholders, and accentuating the 
contrast between the higher and the lower classes. 
Thc commuallands or "egidos," used to be a means to 
ease to a certain extent the conditions in which the small 
agriculturalists found themselves, by affording them the 
opportunity of increasing their income out of what they 
could get from the use of the "commons." 
But the condition ofactual servitude in which the peon 
had always been, was accentuated and aggravated whcn 
the "egidos" disappeared, because, on the one hand, he wa.S 
no more in a position to resort to the products of those com-
munallands, and on the other hand the great influence of the 
landholders was used ás a política! mean8 to make peons 
work on the haciendas and keep them in an actual st~te of 
slavery. 
The largest partof the inhabitantsof towns where "egidos" 
have disappeareddbeing necessarily .comp~lled to live on 
. . . 
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the wages .they get from working on the farms, and these 
wages being not enough to cover their expenses, it has be-
come a common practice to advance money to the peons as 
a loan on account of futurc wages. 
This systcm of lending the peons small amounts of money 
has resulted in accumulating huge debts on their shoulders. 
These debts werc used as a pretext to keep the pcons al-
ways at the scrvice of the landowners, and the peon him-
self has been under the impression that he was legally bound 
to remain on the farm as long as he had not paid up his 
debts. These debts, as a rule, were transferred from father 
to son, thus creating in the rural population of the farm not 
only an actual condition of slavery, but the moral convic-
tion among the peons themselves, that peonagc was a neces-
sary evil which the laws authorized. 
This belief persisted through the ignorance of the peons 
themselves, and through the fact that the clergy has mor-
ally contributed to keep up the system. 
During the first fifteen years of the administration of 
General Diaz, and when he was still strong enough to main-
tain his dictatorial rule, there was no appllient dissatisfaction 
among the rural classes, but later it became neccssary to 
use drastic measures to keep the peons on the farms. 
The large number oí men who were deported from the 
more thickly populated regions, such as Mexico, Puebla, 
Toluca, etc., to the southern statcs, as well as the transpor-
tation by force of a large number of Yaqui Indian families 
from the state of Sonora to work as peons in Yucatan, are 
good examples of the use of public force to provide laborers 
for the "hacienda" and to maintain the condition of servi-
tude of the rural classes in Mexico. 
Since 1880 conditions in Mexico began to be complicated 
by reason of the policies of General Porfirio Diaz for the 
development oí the country. General Diaz thought that 
the best way to develop the resources of Mexico was to 
favor the establishment of Iarge business enterprises and the 
formation of large corporations to which special advantages 
were offered. 
General Porfirio Diaz granted large concessions in landa, 
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mmes, railroads, industrial and banking institutions to 
foreign investors, thus creating enormous monopolies and 
making more accentuated the contrast between the rich 
and the laboring classes of the nation. The cost of living 
was raised by the increasing of capital. The wages of 
miners, railroad men and those of the industrial classes 
were somewhat increased, although not in proportion to 
the increased high cost of living. The wages of the rural 
Iaborer did not enjoy this increase, the salary of the peon 
still remaining at a ridiculously low average. Notwith-
standing the low rate of agricultura! wages, the great land 
owners were still able to obtain labor thanks to their política! 
influence which allowed them to keep the peons anyhow. 
During General Diaz's administration, therefore, efforts 
were never made for the formation of a middle class. On 
the contrary, the power of the wealthy classes increased 
considerably, and a new privileged class arose from the 
great railroad, mining, banking and industrial concession-
aires. The condition of the Iower classes, on the other 
hand, was excessively precarious, and lately it beeame so 
grave, that during the last days of General Diaz's régime 
it is safe to say that the slavery oí the peons was the prin-
cipal cause of the unrest spreading throughout the country, 
and General Diaz had to resort very frequently to the use 
of force to maintain peace. 
POLITICAL ASPECT 
The economic unrest felt in Mexico during the last years 
of General Diaz's administration, had for its principal 
eauses those which ha ve already been enumerated, but this 
economic unrest was aggravated by political conditions. 
Tbe política! problem is very complex, but it can be out;.. 
lined or summed up as follows. 
No constitutional system, properly speaking, can he said 
to have existed in Mexico prior to 1857. Towards 1857 the 
Constitution was adopted, but it was patterned largely on 
the French and American Constitutions, without taking 
into consideration the special conditions of Mexico. 
The Constitution adopted in 1857 has been theoretically 
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in force ever since, but as a. matter of fact it has never been 
applied on account of the Reform War, tbe French inter-
vention, and the very abnormal conditions in which the 
country found itself during tbe administration of Juarez 
and Lerdo. 
General Diaz entirely abandoned the Constitution of 
1857 to follow a dictatorial regime. 
In its política! provisions tbe Constitution was never 
applied during General Diaz's administration. Elections 
of governors, local legislatures, congress, supreme court, 
etc., never took place, General Diaz himself making all tbe 
appointments. 
Mexicans never had, therefore, the opportunity to test 
their Constitution, nor to see how it workcd, and to find 
out whether it was suitable for the conditions of the country 
or not. 
As rcgards justice, libcrties and constitutional guarantees, 
the Constitution was never enforced for Mexicans, except 
in the cases where General Diaz thought it convenient. 
Only the wealthier classes could enjoy those liberties, they 
having sidficient infiuence to exact them from the President 
or from tbe supreme court. 
Foreigncrs, also, by reason of their influence or through 
diplomatic pressure, have always been granted those liber-
ties and guarantecs recognized by the Constitution. These 
discretional and unequal applications of the Constitution as 
regards individual guarantees, Iargely contributed to ac-
centuate the difference already existing between the privi-
leged classes and the masses. 
Tbe Constitution of 1857 undoubtedly presenta a great 
number of points which make it absolutely unfit for the 
eountry. 
The lack of municipal government, the unreasonable and 
arbitrary division of tbe country into so many states, the 
system of election of judges, the universal suffrage and 
even the system adopted for the substitution of the chief 
executive, and many other inadequate provisions, lead to 
the necessity of a general and fundamental revision of the 
Mexican Constitution. 
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The adrninistration of General Diaz can then be summed 
up by saying that it was a dictatorial regime with exceptioM 
in favor of the wealthy classes and joreigners. As a matter 
of fact, these exceptions were practically privileges, since 
90 per cent of the population of the country did not enjoy 
either justice, or liberties, or guarantees. 
From the political point oí view, the administration of 
General Diaz, produced the same results as was produced 
from an economic point of view. It deepened the dimswn 
already existing between the higher and the lower classes. 
Any party wishing to establish peace in Mexico must 
take in consideration these three aspects of the Mexican 
situation. The Constitutionalist party wishes to solve the 
social problem oí Mexico by fostering education so as to 
leve! the barriers between the upper and Iower classes, as 
soon as possible. The Constitutionalist party wishes to 
improve the condition of the Iower classes, so as to begin 
the creation of a middle class. In política! matters the 
Constitutionalist party wishes the government of Mexico 
to abide by the Constitution, but at the same time wishes 
it to be so reformed as to meet the needs of the country. 
Since 1895 there has been a feeling of unrest in Mexico 
which made itself more apparent during the last years of 
General Diaz's government. This feefing of restlessness 
was not well defined, and even when it led to severa! armed 
movements after 1905, it was generally thought that they 
were only insurrections of a local character or mere riots. 
When in 1908 General Diaz announced in the famous Creel-
man interview that he was ready to retire, public opinion 
in Mexico was profoundly stirred. Opposite tendencies 
appeared; one instigated by the friends of General Diaz, 
which demanded his reelection or the election of a man 
who wou!d continue his policies, and the other which wished 
a change in the government and in the system. 
It was at that time that don Francisco I. Madero organized 
the anti-reelection party, and that he began his electoral 
campaign under the motto "effective voting and no-re-
election." It was supposed that the best remedy for the 
Mexlcan situatlon would be a free election of a president, 
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and the establishment in the política! laws of the principie 
of one term. The política! problem seemed to be the most 
important of all questions, and it absorbed entirely the 
public's attention so that the economic and social problems 
were lost sight of. 
General Diaz accepted very easily his last reelection, and 
permitted to be named with him, as vice-president, Ramón 
Corral, who represented the perpetuation of the Diaz ré-
gime. No other candidates than Diaz and Corral were ad-
mitted. Madero was arrested before the elections, and the 
triumph of the Diaz-Corral ticket made it apparent that it 
was impossible to obtain a politieal change by ballot. 
On bis escape from prison, Francisco I. Madero started 
the revolution. Thc plan of San Luis Potosi, which was 
the basis of the movement, mude it clear that the leaders 
still considered as the chief problem of Mexico a political 
change, and the purpose of that plan was chiefly a change 
of government. 
The rural classes, however, followed Madero, and supported 
him in the revolution initiated by him, under the tacit belíef 
that bis revolution would bring sorne agrarian reforms which 
were needed to improve the condition of the masses, but 
which were not yet enunciated in any concrete form. 
General Diaz believed that he would stop the revolution 
by bis retiring from power. The ncgotiations at Juarez, 
by which General Diaz agreed to retire and to deliver the 
government to a provisional president, checked the revolu-
tion precisely when it began to acquire its actual strength 
and real form. 
De la Barra, a vacillating and Jesuitic character, had no 
formative policy during bis administration. As a creature 
of General Diaz, intimately connected with the conserva-
tive element of the old régime, he merely limited himself to 
muster out the revolutionary army, as the way in which he 
understood peace ought to be reestablished. 
By this negative action he minimized the effect of the 
revolution and be prepared a reaction in favor of the old 
régime. The same men who surrounded General Diaz and 
who had urged the continuation of bis policies, returned to 
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the country when they saw that they were not persecuted, 
and started a political campaign against Madero and against 
the revolution. It was during this period that efforts were 
made to concentrate the public opinion in favor of General 
Reyes and De la Barra himself as presidential candidates 
against Madero. ' 
It was at this same time that the clerical party which since 
1867 had shown no signs of life, was revived under the name 
of the Catholic party, and clearly showed that it favored 
the reactionary principies of the Diaz réginie. 
De la Barra's ad-interim administration can be summed 
up by saying that while he received the governinent in trust 
to be turned over to the revolution, he did everything in his 
power to keep it for himself and to avoid the advent of the 
new réginie, thus showing disloyalty both to Madero person-
ally, and to the revolution itself. 
When Madero carne into power in November, 1911, he 
found the government in such condition that he was unable 
to change its direction, and was forced to accept existing 
conditions and even the same cabinet appointed by De la 
Barra, in which the most influential part was played by 
Ministers Calero, Hernández and Ernesto Madero. 
Surrounded by nearly all Diaz followers, Madero could 
not establish a reform policy. During al! the time of his 
government, he was constantly called by two opposite ten-
dencies: on one side the reactionary in fayor of the Diaz 
réginie, and on the other side the revolutionary. 
Madero tried to make friends of the Diaz partisans but 
unsuccessfully. At the same time he lost the support of 
the greater part of the men who had helped him during the 
revolution. 
At the very beginning of Madero's administration a 
protesting movement started, which was backed by some 
of the old régime. The insurrections of Pascual Orozco and 
of General Bernardo Reyes were no more than attempts of 
reaction against the 1910 revolution. The insurrection of 
Félix Diaz in the month of September, 1912, demonstrated 
that the reactionary sentiment had acquired a great impor-
tance, and that the army, which was the same army left by 
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General Porfirio Diaz, was not in sympathy with the revo-
lution nor with Madero personally. 
The uprising of the arsenal at Mexico City in the month 
of February, 1913, was the most vigorous reactionary move-
ment of any started against Madero, and it gave General 
Huerta a chance to place himself at the head of the re-
action. 
General Huerta, who had been in the army since the time 
of General Diaz's administration, remained in it during the 
ad-interim administration of De la Barra, and later was 
under the orders of President Madero. 
In the spring of 1912, Huerta had rendered President 
Madero very important services in overcoming the revolu-
tionary movement started by Pascual Orozco in.Chihuahua. 
The prestige acquired by General Huerta after his cam-
paign against Orozco, made him appear as one of the rising 
political figures in Mexico, in spite of his deficient culture, 
and his not very commendable personal habits. The enemies 
of Madero soon began to drop words of personal ambition 
in his ear, and finally succe~ded in convincing him that he 
was the most prominent of the military officers and Madero's 
chief support in maintaining power. 
When in the month of February General Félix Diaz cap-
tured thc arsenal, Huerta, who was then the commander-
in-chief of President Madero's troops, did not make, as a 
matter of fact, any serious effort to recapture the arsenal 
and overcome :Félix Diaz. He had already realized that 
the fa te of the government was in his hands, and during the 
tragic ten days of the bombardment of the city he kept a 
dubious attitude. 
The fight, or rather the firing sustained by either side, 
was used by Félix Diaz's supporters as a moral pressure to 
bear on Madero to obtain his resignation. Various in-
fiuences were resorted to for that purpose. Finally, the 
pressure brought to bear by the foreign residents and the 
diplomatic representatives, gave Huerta an excuse to attempt 
his coup; seemingly with the purpose of reestablishing peace 
through the arrest and deposition of Madero and Pino Suarez. 
The principal rllle in this coup d'etat, as regards the help 
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given by foreign residents and diplomats to the uprising of 
Félix Diaz and the subsequent overthrow of Madero by 
Huerta, was played by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, American 
ambassador. He can be considered as the chief adviser of 
Huerta and Diaz, during the bombardment and, indeed, as 
the one really responsible for that coup d'etat. 
After Madero and Pino Suarez had been arrested, they 
were compelled to hand in their resignations. As provided 
by the Mexican Constitution, the secretary of foreign rela-
tions, Mr. Pedro Lascuráin, took charge of the executive 
power, but only for a few minutes, just long enough to ap-
point Huerta as secretary of the interior and to hand in 
his own resignation himself. By virtue of this resignation, 
Huerta was to assume the presidency at once. 
The Mexican congress, acting under duress, and believing 
that the lives of the president and the vice-president would 
thus be spared, accepted their resignations, and endorsed 
the appointment of Huerta as president of the Republic. 
The assassination of Madero and Pino Suarez was an act 
of a purely politieal character; it was discussed and ap-
proved by General Huerta and his cabinet' as the most 
expeditious way oí iemoving all possible obstacles to the 
political success of the new administration. Huerta thought 
that by putting Madero and Pino Suarez out of the way he 
would remain practically without enemies. He was mistaken 
in thinking that Madero and Pino Suarez were the only ob-
stacles that the new administration would have to over-
come. 
General Huerta's administration, both on account of its 
acts and of its men, was a thorough restoration of the dicta-
torial régime of General Diaz, with the only difference that 
the dictator was now Huerta, and that dictatorial measures 
and rigorous methods were carried to an extreme they had 
never reached before, not even in the most hazardous times 
of General Diaz's administration. 
• The cnbinet of General Huerta, which waa appointed in accord with 
Fé!ix Diaz, waa: Francisco L. de la Barra, Alberto Garcla Granados, 
Toribio Esquive! Obregón, Rodolfo Reyes, Manuel Mondragón, Alberto 
Robles Gil y Jorge Vera Eataf!ol. 
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During Madero's govcrnment, the position of the revolu-
tionary element was uncertain and awkward, because while 
they were supposed to be exercising a great political influence 
through Madero, practically they had no influcnce whatcver 
since the Madero government was almost controlled by the 
conservative cabinet. 
Aiter the death of President Madero, the position of the 
revolutionary elements becarne clear. During his life, for 
reasons of loyalty and hope of a change, they had never taken 
an aggressive attitude, but once the president was dead and 
nothing to be hoped for from Huerta, there was no difficulty 
in renewing the struggle. 
Huerta represented the reaction and his government was 
no more than the restoration of the governrnent of General 
Diaz, with its same procecdings and the samc roen, undcr 
the orders of another chief. 
The revolution against Huerta is nothing more than the 
revolution started in 1910 by Madero, and which having 
been checked in 1911 by virtue of the negotmtions of Juarez 
and the election of Madero, now continued and entered into 
full activity, augmented because of the revolting circum-
stances under which the fall of Madero had taken place. 
The death of Madero has been one of the most powerful sen-
timental factors to increase the revolutionary movement 
against Huerta. 
I t has been very widely stated that thc Carranza movement 
has only the purpose of avenging the death of Madero and 
reinstating the office-holders appointed by hirn. This is not 
the case. The purposes of the Constitutionalists are higher 
and better defined than werc thc motives of the 1910 move-
ment. The Constitutionalists propose the reestablishment 
of a Constitutional governrnent in Mexico, but as they real-
ize the unfitness of the Mexican Constitution and other laws, 
they intend to reform them in order to ha ve a system fitted 
to the country. 
There is no doubt that peace in Mexico cannot be estab-
lished unless a complete ehange takes place in the govern-
ment's personnel and in the systems and laws. This is the 
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reason that the Constitutionalists appear too radical to those 
who would like to find a way of pacifying Mexico at once. 
The Constitutionalists mean to begin immediately such 
economic reforms and specially such agrarian reforms as are 
· necessary to offer to the lower classes an opportunity of 
improving their conditions: division of large estates, equal-
ization of taxation, and in placea where it would be neces-
sary, the reestablishment of the "egidos" or communa,lland 
system. 
